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Khouzama Makarem, Mahdi Karim and Ali Jaroush17 September 2026
Source: AFP
This investigation reveals an upsurge in inflammatory language on X driven by sectarian fears about internally displaced Lebanese people. The surge coincided with the resumption of the war on March 2, 2024, and the resulting displacement of hundreds of thousands of Lebanese people. It continued until the ceasefire agreement, when displaced people began returning home.
“We don’t rent to women who wear hijab, and you’d be better off looking for somewhere a long way from here.” Zahra never expected to receive such a response when she went looking somewhere safe to stay. This young woman from southern Lebanon had been forced to leave home in Nabatieh with her family at dawn on 2 March 2026 following Israeli airstrikes across the country.
For Zahra and many Lebanese like her, the renewed war came as no surprise. For months they had been living under the strain of continuous Israeli violations of the ceasefire agreement, brokered internationally in late November 2024. The southern front had become active on 8 October 2023, in what became known as the “support front” for Gaza. Confrontations then escalated during 2024 into a comprehensive Israeli ground and air campaign, which caused heavy casualties and material losses and widespread displacement.
After being stuck in traffic for hours with thousands of other displaced people, Zahra reached the Abra neighborhood near Sidon, where her family stayed temporarily in her aunt’s house. Looking for housing large enough for her family, she contacted a landlord who had advertised apartments for rent on social media. But instead of answering her questions about the apartment, he began questioning her about which sect she belonged, whether she wore a hijab, and what her political affiliations were. He said finally: “We don’t rent to women who wear hijab. You know, we’re mainly Christians here, and we don’t want the hijab getting in here. You’re Shia, and we’re scared you might be a target, and then our lives and those of others here will be at risk.”
It was a similar story in Kaifoun, a town near Aley in the Mount Lebanon Governorate, where Mariam – a university student from the town of Tallouseh in the Marjayoun district of southern Lebanon – had taken refuge with her family in a small basement in a house for the duration of the war. But the short-lived sense of safety was shattered when a nearby building was shelled.
In the middle of the night, Mariam and her family were asked to leave the basement quickly, as the owners of the building next door feared having displaced people there might make their building a target. They packed up their things and set off into the unknown. But then one of the family managed to use contacts at the local council, which meant they could go back to the basement with an official guarantee. This agreement, however, meant their daily life was restricted. They were not allowed to wear abayas or have visitors. And such was the level of mistrust that anyone who came to see the family was questioned.
Traumatic displacement was just the start of more suffering, which the displaced faced throughout their months of exile. Zahra’s and Mariam’s stories mirror those of thousands of others who fled the war in search of safety, only to find themselves confronting another war that was no less brutal, one that continued to haunt them even after they had left the battlefield behind.
Within a month of the war starting, over a million people had been displaced, according to the daily reports put out by the Disaster Risk Management Unit. They had fled from southern Lebanon, from the southern suburbs of Beirut, and also the western and northern Bekaa. Of these, 136,000 ended up in state-run shelters, but most went to the homes of relatives in different parts of the country, or rented housing. It was this last group who were most often the target of online disinformation campaigns.
Our investigation tracked all posts about displaced people made from February to July 2026. We analyzed selected posts on X (formerly Twitter) targeting the displaced on a sectarian basis, using the term “Shi’a displaced persons”. These posts were linked to several hashtags, including “Iran_proxy_war”, “Hezbollah_terrorist”, ‘MLGA’, “Hezbollah” and, in particular, “Lebanon”. In the second week of the war there was an upsurge in the number of posts. Most of them—33.5 percent—were from accounts based in Lebanon, followed by Saudi Arabia and then the US.
The language in these posts can be described as sectarian hate speech, because it incites discrimination against the displaced based on their religious affiliation, harming them directly, even if there is no explicit call for murder or physical violence.
The UN defines hate speech as: “communication that attacks or uses derogatory or discriminatory language to refer to a person or group on the basis of their identity; in other words, on the basis of their religion, race, nationality, ethnicity, skin color, descent, gender or any other element of their identity”.
The posts we analyzed for the most part rejected the idea of accepting displaced people and called for them to be deported by sea to Cyprus. They promoted claims that these people were a security risk and a demographic threat, particularly in predominantly Christian areas, sometimes evoking memories of the Lebanese civil war. Posts also included visual and written material alleging that displaced people had vandalized public property or used it to store weapons, in a bid to tarnish their image and turn public opinion against them.
Freedom of expression versus incitement to hatred: The Rabat Plan of Action
The Rabat Plan of Action proposes strict criteria for determining restrictions on freedom of expression and incitement to hatred, and for the application of Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It sets out a six-part test that takes into account (1) the social and political context; (2) the status of the speaker; (3) the intent to incite the audience against a targeted group; (4) the content and form of the speech; (5) the extent of its dissemination; and (6) the likelihood of harm, including imminence.
On May 14, 2024, former Secretary-General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah, who was subsequently assassinated in an Israeli airstrike, called on the Lebanese authorities to allow Syrian refugees who were willing to leave Lebanon voluntarily to embark for Europe from Lebanese ports. He was critical of the ban on them emigrating, saying: “Let us resolve as a nation to say: ‘Dear Syrian brothers who have been displaced, whoever wishes to leave for Europe or Cyprus, the sea is before you; so take to the boats and set sail.’”
Nasrallah’s statement came at a time when the EU and the US were under pressure to help repatriate Syrian refugees and provide them with help once they returned.
While monitoring content posted online, we noticed that an account with the name “Bilal_D75” had the idea of using Nasrallah’s speech and reposting it in a different context—to target the Shia community: “Any of you Shia refugees from the south who wants to leave for Europe or Cyprus, the sea is before you, so make that your ship and set sail.” This was accompanied by offensive remarks like: “To hell with you and anyone who feels sorry for you.”
Research showed that the Bilal_D75 account belongs to someone called “Abu Majd”, who lives in Lebanon and has changed his profile nine times. He previously wrote that he was “a supporter of the rights of the Syrian people until my last breath”, also describing his account as an “online troll”.
Bilal_D75 was also the most influential account we found, generating 1,300 interactions on X, with a reach of 101,000. Results showed that 84 posts used the exact same wording. Most of these were in late May and mid-June. The peak was in mid-June and coincided with the intensification of Israeli evacuation warnings in southern Lebanon during the first ten days of that month.
Nasrallah’s original language was therefore repurposed as evacuation warnings intensified, triggering large waves of displacement. This also coincided with displaced people being placed in reception centers—134,534 of them on 10 June 2026, according to the Disaster Risk Management Unit.
82.5K Potential Reach
displaced people
The results showed that more than ten accounts reposted content verbatim from Bilal_D75, citing it as the original source. The posts were made close together in two specific phases. The first began on 31 May 2026, when the Muawiyah87 account reposted the content at 16:49 that afternoon, followed by two other accounts—MNM20053 and JusticeEyesss from Saudi Arabia—at 16:58. Further reposts followed at 17:44, 18:24, 20:27, 20:30, 20:34, 20:44 and 20:50 via other accounts.
Accounts that reposted the Bilal_D75 account content during the first wave
A second wave of posts began appearing at 00:03 on 2 June, with reposts at 00:34 and 00:40. They began again at 05:34, continuing on other accounts through the morning at 09:05, 09:59, 10:04, 10:29 and 11:23 until 14:32.
Accounts that reposted and circulated the Bilal_D75 post
This data shows that there was a coordinated, inflammatory mass mobilization campaign, originating from the Bilal_D75 account. This is evident from the matching wording, its reposting by several accounts within a short period, and the fact that posts came in two separate waves. The Bilal_D75 account was also prominent as a hub for circulating these posts, and its content was predominantly negative.
This account was not the only digital campaign targeting the internally displaced in Lebanon. It was in fact a broader pattern involving accounts belonging to media figures and politicians that posted explicitly sectarian content.
The language used sought to reduce displaced people to their sectarian affiliation and associate that affiliation with a particular political and security identity. This in turn justified refusing to accept them or allow them to be in certain parts of Lebanon and portraying them as a demographic and security threat.
On the night the war broke out, and a wave of refugees headed toward the capital, Beirut, swelling the population of the suburbs, a post on the “Rabih Chatila” account attacked a specific group of those displaced on the basis of their sectarian identity and political affiliation. It read: “We, the people of Beirut, refuse to accept Iranian Shi’ites and the Shi’ite milieu that nurtures evil, terrorism, collaboration, treason and takfir in our city of Beirut or its suburbs. And we call on the Lebanese state, the security forces and the army to strike with an iron fist anyone who attempts to take over or attack public or private spaces.”
The post accuses the Shia community of being subservient to Iran and uses the term “nurturing environment” to make accusations of “treason, takfir and collaboration” against them. Over the course of several months, this account holder posted messages calling for the “liberation” of Beirut from the Shia.
Talkwalker analysis indicates the account holder is posting from the US, though we have not been able to verify this. His Facebook page, however, suggests that he lives in Lebanon, running the company CPH World Media, and that his real name is Mohamad Rabih Chatila.
Source: AFP
On 22 March, there was an outcry against opening a shelter for the displaced in Karantina, which turned out to be one of the clearest examples of the use of inflammatory tactics and hate speech.
During this controversy over the establishment of this shelter in the Karantina area, next to the Port of Beirut, journalist and political analyst Joseph Abu Fadel said in an interview on Al Jadeed TV, that housing displaced people in predominantly Christian areas “poses a danger”, claiming that they were infiltrated by Hezbollah fighters. He also said their presence in Karantina posed demographic risks and could exacerbate tension, which, he said, could spark civil war.
He reposted what he said in a tweet on 22 March, which received over 170,000 views and 1,016 interactions, and was retweeted by 107 other accounts.
“If the ‘(temporary) state of Greater Lebanon’ insists on altering the demographics of Christian areas by settling 3,000 families of our displaced brothers at the northern entrance to #Beirut port in Karantina, in Jisr Beirut, and the entrances to the highways to the eastern region – Metn, Baabda, Achrafieh, Medawar and Saifi—it will stir up serious internal strife and intractable sectarian and religious problems, with consequences that will be hard to contain.
“We have provided this simple introduction to remind those that need reminding that the road to Jerusalem did not pass through Jounieh and Achrafieh, but though a cargo ship in the Port of Beirut … The sensitivity that stops our displaced Lebanese Shia brothers from entering a Christian area like Karantina doesn’t stem from hatred or malice, but from the bloodshed and tears the area has endured… So this republic, which is disintegrating at lightning speed, must steer clear of such problems, at least for a few months, or perhaps less, if those in charge are to survive the consequences of what they have brought upon themselves and upon our beloved homeland.”
Similar language was echoed by ministers, MPs and media figures , including a former minister for social affairs, Richard Kouyoumjian. He not only rejected the idea of accepting displaced people near the port, but went as far as calling their presence a “ticking time bomb” that threatened the Lebanese people’s security and stability.
Alongside the demographic threat, there was vocal opposition to taking in displaced people on the grounds that this posed a security threat to host communities. A number of officials took this position over the proposed resettlement of refugees in Karantina, including MP Razi al-Hajj, a member of the Strong Republic Bloc, who tweeted on X: “We won’t accept the Karantina-Port area being turned into a security hotspot under the guise of giving shelter to displaced people.”
Father Hanna Khoury, meanwhile, called in a video message for no displaced persons to be accepted in Christian areas, specifically the “Al-Qalaa and Al-Jadida” districts, and demanded they be evicted from homes, calling the situation “dangerous”.
Lebanese Forces MP Razi al-Hajj appeared on MTV claiming that Hezbollah members had infiltrated the displaced: “Let’s not beat around the bush; there are people with links to Hezbollah with military roles who are living in these areas with their families, and Israel is looking for them.”
Former Lebanese minister May Chidiac said in a television interview: “They’re prepared to be displaced and die a hundred times over. You can’t feel sorry for these people.”
In the same vein, Nabil Boumnsaf, deputy editor-in-chief of An-Nahar, appeared in a video posted on the newspaper’s website saying: “Don’t rent out your apartment; it might get you killed. Keeping apartments and people safe is now the most important thing in this war.” He added: “What the local councils are doing may be a good thing, but it’s not enough. It’s not enough to simply register the names of people who come into your building; you don’t know what’s going on between them. Councils aren’t intelligence agencies.”
Alongside this political rhetoric, a media campaign has sought to defame displaced and portraying them as “aggressors and saboteurs”. The “Huna Lubnan” website published an article entitled: “Displaced people occupy private schools in Beirut, whose owners appeal to the state to intervene”. However, the article in question failed to substantiate any of these claims. Nor did it give the names of the schools allegedly attacked, or the names of the owners.
The Transparency website meanwhile published a misleading video claiming “the seizure of weapons and military equipment from displaced people in the town of Sharon, Aley District”, which was shared by several media outlets before the “Voice of Beirut International” page reposted the video under the headline “Weapons found in a school in Tariq El Jdideh housing displaced people affiliated with Hezbollah”.
The accusation that the displaced pose a threat to the lives of host communities aligns closely with the Israeli narrative – disseminated by the occupation army’s Arabic spokesperson and media platforms – that Hezbollah is using Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure for military purposes.
This narrative alleges that weapons or military infrastructure are being kept inside civilian homes, even in places of worship, and in predominantly Christian towns. Such claims have been used to justify threats to evacuate and target civilian areas, and to reinforce the message that any area hosting displaced people, or with a high population density, could become an Israeli target.
https://www.facebook.com/plugins/video.php?href=https://www.facebook.com/reel/2152536545513342/&show_text=0&width=500Video: Avichay Adraee from the IDF’s Arabic-language pageClick to read transcript
This incitement campaign has not been limited to the digital sphere; it has also had real-world consequences. There have been calls to crack down on the displaced and check their identities, with some local councils taking the lead in this. Hammana council stopped displaced people from staying there without its prior approval, and the council in Deir Qoubel decided not to open any shelters for them.
In an interview with Manateq.net, the mayor of Deir Qoubel, Imad Younis, said that the municipality “stayed neutral, as the situation demanded, and no shelters were opened there for displaced people”. He explained that the decision was “political and coordinated between local residents and all parties”, and was because of “specific circumstances in the town that made opening new shelters unsuitable.”
Younis points out that the municipality was wary of the possibility that some of the displaced “might be affiliated with the party (Hezbollah)”. He says such fears were exacerbated after an apartment in Deir Qoubel was targeted: “We really were threatened, and an apartment in Deir Qoubel was hit, which made people even more scared.”
Incitement against the displaced led not only to restrictions on their movements, but also to direct measures and punishments. In the town of Majdal Anjar, a fine of 100 million Lebanese pounds was issued against one individual for taking in a displaced person without first notifying the municipality. The repercussions also escalated into physical assaults. After Israeli airstrikes in Dohat Aramoun, there were tensions and confrontations in the area, during which cars belonging to displaced people were vandalized.
Faced with this situation, many displaced people chose to remain in their homes and towns, despite the imminent danger of daily Israeli airstrikes, which claimed dozens of victims every day. Ali Khalifa, mayor of As-Sarafand in the Sidon area in southern Lebanon, told Manateq.net that the town had “taken in around 2,500 displaced families. That’s about 13,000 people,” and that today there were “around 1,200 families still there, most of them from villages on the front line, or what they now call the ‘Yellow Line’.”
Khalifeh gives several examples of families who fled As-Sarafand, but later returned because they had been mistreated in the places they went to. He says: “Some families faced discrimination because of the way they dressed—wearing an abaya or a hijab—and in some cases, they were even ordered out of buildings.”
Regarding the effect of inflammatory language on social media on displaced people, , Khalifa adds: “Unfortunately, its impact was very significant. Personally, I am not easily provoked, but what I saw on social media was highly provocative. Some of these posts may have been from people with no influence in their communities, but what they said got to people living under bombardment, whose homes had been destroyed, or whose relatives were still trapped under the rubble—and it affected them deeply.”
Source: AFP
There is no doubt that Israeli strikes on areas where displaced people had sought refuge helped fuel tensions and divisions within society. During the war, there were air raids on places hosting thousands of displaced people, leaving many dead and wounded.
On April 8, 2026, Israel launched around 100 simultaneous airstrikes across Lebanon, including Beirut, home to thousands of displaced people. They left 357 people dead and injured 1,223, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Health.
Dr. Zeina Muhanna, Director of Programs and Partnerships at the Amel Association International, told Manateq.net that “inflammatory language is a result of each political faction’s perspective on the war”, noting that it had manifested itself in the form of confrontations inside shelters and incidents on the roads.
Zeina argued that Israel had sought to exacerbate internal rifts through its attacks, exploiting sectarian divisions dating from Lebanon’s civil war, whose effects persisted.
On June 19, a ceasefire came into effect, after which more than 800,000 people cautiously returned to their homes in the south and the southern suburbs of Beirut, according to the UN.
Zahra returned to the south, which continued to suffer heavily from shelling, but she kept the house in Abra, where she had taken refuge, as an option in case things escalate again. After enduring so much and learning from the experience, Zahra now knows where to seek shelter and which areas might accept her, so that she is not confronted again with a situation no less cruel than being displaced in the first place.
This investigation was produced through a partnership between ARIJ and Manateq.